The Industrialization of Rural ChinaOUP Oxford, 2006 M12 21 - 448 páginas The growth of rural industry in China since 1978 has been explosive. Much of the existing literature explains its growth in terms of changes in economic policy. By means of a combination of privatization, liberalization and fiscal decentralization, it is argued, rural industrialization has taken off. This book takes issue with such claims. Using a newly constructed dataset covering all of China's 2000 plus counties and complemented by a detailed econometric study of county-level industrialization in the provinces of Sichuan, Guangdong and Jiangsu, the author demonstrates that history mattered. More precisely, it is argued that the development of rural industry in the Maoist period set in motion a process of learning-by-doing whereby China's rural workforce gradually acquired an array of skills and competencies. As a result, rural industrialization was accelerating well before the 1978 climacteric. The growth of the 1980s and 1990s is therefore likely to be a continuation of this process. Without prior Maoist development of skills, the growth of the post-1978 era would have been much slower, and perhaps would not have occurred at all - as has been the case in countries such as India and Vietnam. This is not to say that the Maoist legacy was without flaw. Many of the rural industries created under Mao were geared towards meeting defence-related objectives resulting in inefficiencies, and there can be no question that post-1978 policy changes facilitated the growth process. But without the Maoist inheritance, rural industrialization across China would have been unsuccessful. |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 91
Página 18
... rate of industrial growth was rapid. But that was the point; the very purpose of the Third Front was to generate industrial growth in relatively under-developed areas. These aggregated data on Third Front regions tell us little directly ...
... rate of industrial growth was rapid. But that was the point; the very purpose of the Third Front was to generate industrial growth in relatively under-developed areas. These aggregated data on Third Front regions tell us little directly ...
Página 22
... growth punctuated by years when output grew by more than 20 percent. One ... rate during 1962–71 for the 12 provinces is considerably higher than the ... growth varied considerably. The output of industrial CBEs in Jiangxi, oddly enough ...
... growth punctuated by years when output grew by more than 20 percent. One ... rate during 1962–71 for the 12 provinces is considerably higher than the ... growth varied considerably. The output of industrial CBEs in Jiangxi, oddly enough ...
Página 23
... Growth rates are based on GVIO data. These data typically exclude all types of sub-brigade industry, including ... rate given here for 1962–71 is actually for 1965–71. (c) The Fujian and Guangdong (excluding Hainan) data are for brigade and ...
... Growth rates are based on GVIO data. These data typically exclude all types of sub-brigade industry, including ... rate given here for 1962–71 is actually for 1965–71. (c) The Fujian and Guangdong (excluding Hainan) data are for brigade and ...
Página 24
... growth rates often understate the true growth rate. The second problem is that it is difficult to document county industrial growth with precision because comprehensive national data do not exist for the Maoist era. Nevertheless ...
... growth rates often understate the true growth rate. The second problem is that it is difficult to document county industrial growth with precision because comprehensive national data do not exist for the Maoist era. Nevertheless ...
Página 25
... growth rate between 1965 and 1978. Secondly, and even despite the inclusion of a pair of Guizhou prefectures, the sample is biased towards comparatively well-off eastern jurisdictions. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the growth ...
... growth rate between 1965 and 1978. Secondly, and even despite the inclusion of a pair of Guizhou prefectures, the sample is biased towards comparatively well-off eastern jurisdictions. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the growth ...
Contenido
1 | |
8 | |
3 Rural Industrialization After 1978 | 48 |
4 The Role of Policy Change | 72 |
5 The Learning Hypothesis | 117 |
6 Learning to Industrialize in the Maoist Era | 141 |
7 The National Evidence | 168 |
8 Jiangsu | 207 |
9 Sichuan | 244 |
10 Guangdong | 285 |
11 Conclusion | 322 |
Appendices | 337 |
Bibliography | 356 |
Index | 389 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
The Industrialization of Rural China Chris Bramall,Lecturer in Contemporary Chinese Studies Chris Bramall Vista previa limitada - 2007 |
Términos y frases comunes
accounted achieved agricultural areas argued average base brigade capital central centres Chengdu China Chinese Chongqing clear close commune compared contributed counties county-level course dependency early economic effect efficient employed enterprises especially estimates evidence example expansion experience extent fact factor figure fiscal foreign further geography given growth rate Guangdong GVIO heavy industry higher human capital impact important included increased industrial employment industrial growth industrial output industrial production initial investment Jiangsu jurisdictions labour late learning less limited literacy located manufacturing Maoist measure million municipality Nevertheless output percent period poor population prefecture problem programme provinces rapid regions regression relatively result rural industrialization sector share Sichuan significant skills SOEs Sources statistically suggests Sunan Table Third Front tion types urban Wenzhou western workers Wuxi yuan