Mixed Arbitral Tribunals.-Parts 9, 10, 11 of the Recueil des Décisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes report many further cases decided under the peace treaties in different countries, the majority of them arising under Article 297 (e) of the Treaty of Versailles. Five of these cases seem to claim special attention by reason of their importance. In two of them. Macleod Russell & Co. v. Germany (p. 547) and The Owners of s.s. Seaham Harbour v. Germany (p. 550), both decisions of the Anglo-German Tribunal, the question was raised whether compensation for private property requisitioned in Germany ought to be claimed under the Reparation Sections of the Treaty of Versailles or whether the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal had jurisdiction under the Private Property Clauses. The Tribunal decided that it had jurisdiction. In the third case, William Brandt's Sons & Co. v. Ludwig Tillmann (p. 554), also a decision of the Anglo-German Tribunal, it was held that a British secured creditor is entitled to payment through the German Clearing Office of the full amount of his debt without regard to the value of the security, and that the security is caught by Article 297 (b). In the Franco-German case of Georges Maridort v. L. Behrens (p. 581) it was decided that where a contract was abrogated at the outbreak of war and property belonging to one of the parties remained in the hands of the other, the duties of the latter with regard to the property are to be determined by the rules governing the quasi-contractual relationship of "gestion d'affaires." In the Anglo-German case of Chamberlain and Hookham, Ltd. v. Solar Zahlerwerke G.m.b.h. (p. 723) it was held that, whatever might have been decided as to the nationality of a company incorporated outside Germany but controlled by Germans, a company incorporated in Germany under German law and having its registered office in Germany was a German national for the purposes of Article 296, even if all its shares were held by British subjects. The American Journal of International Law.--The principal articles in the first issue of the Journal for 1922 deal with American policy and problems in the Far East. Tyler writes of American "Good Offices" in Asia, George A. Finch of American diplomacy and the financing of China, and B. H. Williams of the Protection of American citizens in China. The editorial comment is noteworthy for a review by David Jayne Hill of the proceedings of the second Assembly of the League of Nations. This distinguished member of the Board of Editors there gained the impression that the necessity of radical changes in the Covenant was generally accepted, that the recommendation of the Assembly with regard to the reduction of armaments was felt to offer only a faint hope of results and that the Assembly had no serious control over mandates. He concludes his description of the meeting by a criticism the Assembly, he feels, "does not venture boldly to lay hold upon the most vital realities of the European situation. It is not fully representative of Europe; and, bound by its Covenant, which 1 Librairie de la Société du Recueil. Paris: Sirey, 1922 is an article in a treaty of peace imposed by war, it cannot be. . . . Quite evidently, the League is gradually seceding from the obligations of its Covenant. To become a real association for peace, it must transform itself fundamentally. And this, in my belief, it will continue to do." This issue of The American Journal also reports further awards of the British and American Claims Arbitration Tribunal, and the Supplement of Documents contains the peace treaties between the United States and Germany, Austria and Hungary. NOTICES OF BOOKS. WORKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. WAR AND NEUTRALITY. WHEN Professor Oppenheim's death came in October 1919 the work of preparing a third edition of his treatise,1 upon which he had been occupied for some time, was still unfinished. Happily, the publishers found in his faithful pupil, Mr. Roxburgh, formerly a Whewell scholar in the University of Cambridge, a thoroughly qualified editor to complete the unfinished task. The first volume as revised by Mr. Roxburgh was published in 1920, and the second volume has now made its appearance. With him the undertaking has been a genuine labour of love, and he has performed the task with the conscientiousness of one upon whom has fallen the duty of executing the trust of a devoted friend. The task has not been without difficulty. Professor Oppenheim himself had left many notes, but they were not always complete, and it is not improbable that had he lived he would have altered some of his conclusions in the light of subsequent events and more mature reflection. Upon a goodly number of questions he left no memoranda at all, or only fragmentary notes which were doubtless intended to be the basis of more complete observations. Upon the editor devolved the somewhat difficult task of weaving into the body of the text the author's own materials, of endeavouring to say for him what he himself would have said, had he lived to finish his undertaking, of rewriting and bringing up to date pages which needed revision and of adding new matter upon questions and events which arose or occurred subsequent to the author's death. As to the new matter added, it is not always clear what represents the contribution of the author and what is the work of the editor. But we are told in the editor's preface that Professor Oppenheim himself revised the section (53), dealing with the legality of war, section 57a, relative to the threatened disappearance of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, various sections concerning the rights and duties of neutrals, reprisals and the right of angary, and some of the sections relating to contraband, the seizure of enemy reservists, on neutral vessels, prize law, and other matters. The editor added 1 International Law, by L. Oppenheim, formerly Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge. Vol. II-"War and Neutrality." Third edition. Edited by Ronald F. Roxburgh. (Longmans, Green & Co., 1921.) Pp. v-xlv, 4-671. 36s. net. some pages dealing with the League of Nations, upon which Professor Oppenheim had published a monograph, expanded the author's notes on aerial warfare into a new chapter, added new sections dealing with long distance blockades, and incorporated new matter on a great variety of subjects upon which the author had left no notes. The revision of the second volume, which deals with war and neutrality, proved to be a much larger undertaking than the revision of volume I, which covers the law of peace-this, because of the numerous changes and additions made necessary by the events of the World War. During this war, as is well known, not only nearly every old question of war law was raised, sometimes again and again, but many questions which were entirely new and often novel had to be interpreted and applied. A variety of new instruments and unprecedented methods were employed during this war for the first time. The submarine torpedo-boat and automatic mine, armed merchantmen, poisonous gases, the airship, wireless telegraphy and other new instrumentalities and agencies all played an important rôle. What is more, the war was carried on under conditions which were largely different from those under which all former wars were fought. Rules, therefore, which had been formulated to meet the old conditions proved inadequate or illogical. It is not surprising that they were interpreted so as to make them conform to the new conditions or were entirely disregarded. In respect to many questions which arose during the war there were no rules of international law at all or only very imperfect rules. Such was the case of aerial warfare, concerning which there was no law except article 25 of the Hague regulations which prohibits the bombardment of "undefended" places by aircraft-a rule of little practical value, since it lays down no test for distinguishing between "defended" and "undefended" places. In fact, it served as little or no restraint at all upon the conduct of belligerents. As to other matters, there was a divergence of opinion as to what the law required or permitted. The events of the war, therefore, abundantly demonstrated not only the ineffectiveness but indeed the utter inadequacy of the existing body of conventional and customary law for the regulation of the conduct of both belligerents and neutrals. Under these circumstances, the World War was of unprecedented significance in its effect upon international law. To have considered with any degree of adequacy all the questions of international law, new and old, to which the war gave rise, to have examined the conflicting interpretations and practices of belligerents and neutrals, and to have discussed the results upon international law, would have necessitated the rewriting of Oppenheim's original treatise, and its expansion into several volumes. This task lay beyond the purpose of the author and the editor. They limited themselves merely to the addition of such new matter and to such alterations as were necessary to bring the treatise up to date and to record the more important events and results in so far as they affected the development of international law. As it is, there are few pages on which there are not references to the World War. On account of the limitations of space it necessarily happened that the new matter added often consists merely of citations to important cases and of references to other sources of information where the details may be found. There is a great abundance of matter of this kind, either interwoven in the text or inserted in copious footnotes. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how more could have been done or better done without going beyond the task set for the editor. One may regret that the author and the editor did not more frequently express their own opinions on the more important controverted questions raised in respect to the interpretation and application of the law. The views of the author, in particular, who was one of the acknowledged masters of international law, would have been interesting and instructive to students of international law. But, even admitting that it is within the rightful province of the jurist to evaluate and pass judgment, there were sufficient reasons why both the author and the editor generally refrained from expressing their own views on the points in controversy. As to Professor Oppenheim, the notes which he left were written from time to time as the events with which they dealt occurred, and were probably not always intended to represent the final form which he expected to give them. As to Mr. Roxburgh, he naturally did not consider that it properly fell within his province to express his own opinions in the work of another, of which he was merely the editor. And as to both, the limitations of space left little opportunity for more than a brief statement of the more important facts. Nevertheless, the author did occasionally express his own opinions. Thus he qualifies as an "absurdity" the opinion sometimes expressed that war and law are inconsistent and that the existence of war is the negation of law. He points out that the events of the late war, coupled with certain conditions of modern life, threaten to break down the timehonoured distinction between the armed forces and the civilian population, yet he does not admit that the assimilation can be carried to the point where it ought to be recognized as legitimate, for example, for an aviator to fly far beyond the theatre of war, and drop his deadly bombs upon peaceful civil populations. It may be remarked, in this connexion, that in his new chapter on aerial warfare he points out that the injury done to innocent non-combatants and private property by aerial raiders during the World War was out of all proportion to the military damage wrought, and he gives us his opinion that the limits within which aviators ought to be allowed to commit raids outside the theatre of military and naval operations should be regulated by international agreement. He speaks again and again of the "nefarious" submarine methods of the Germans and the shooting of Captain Fryatt is properly denounced as a plain case of judicial murder. Regarding the violation of fundamental rules of international law by belligerents, he ventures the suggestion that the League of Nations should intervene to prevent such acts. He even expressed the opinion that the duty of impartiality by which |