The Power and Value of Philosophical SkepticismRowman & Littlefield, 1996 - 110 páginas How should we react to philosophical skepticism? Jeffrey P. Whitman answers this question in The Power and Value of Philosophical Skepticism by examining analytic and post-analytic responses to the problem of skepticism concerning our knowledge of the external world. Whitman analyzes skeptical arguments that call into question our ability to obtain empirical knowledge. He tests analytical theories of knowledge (foundationalism, coherentalism, and reliabilism) and the post-analytical responses of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty against skeptical arguments. Whitman explores the failure of analytic and post-analytic theories and concludes that embracing a theoretical version of philosophical skepticism has advantages over post-analytic responses - both in the realm of philosophical inquiry and in everyday life. |
Contenido
The Problem of Empirical Knowledge | 1 |
An Analysis of Empirical Knowledge | 5 |
Skepticism | 15 |
Doxastic Theories of Knowledge | 27 |
Nondoxastic Theories of Knowledge | 41 |
Moores Argument from Common Sense | 53 |
PostAnalytic Solutions to Skepticism | 61 |
PostAnalytical Solutions to Skepticism Part II | 75 |
Theory Practice and Skepticism | 85 |
Bibliography | 105 |
| 109 | |
About the Author | |
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answer antiskeptic appear argue Aristotle assumption basic beliefs BonJour chapter claim to know closure principle cognitive coherence theories common sense conceptual scheme context criteria Davidson Descartes discover doubt doxastic theories dreaming edifying philosophy Empirical Knowledge epistemic justification Ernest Sosa examples external world externalist theory false first-person foundation foundationalism foundationalist foundationalist theory further justification Gadamer hermeneutical Hilary Putnam Hume intellectual virtues J-rules Kant kind language Laurence BonJour merely metajustificatory argument metaphysical realism Mirror of Nature Moore Moore's moral knowledge naturalized epistemology nondoxastic theories Nozick objective truth objective world one's beliefs perceptual beliefs perspective philosophical inquiry philosophical skepticism phronesis Plantinga Pollock possibility practical premise priori problem properly basic propositions putative knower Putnam question Quine Quine's reality realm reason reject Rorty Rorty's seems sensory experience skeptic's argument solutions to skepticism sort Sosa Stroud Structure of Empirical theoretical skepticism theories of knowledge things truisms truth-conducive University Press Wittgenstein