appeal to the Judicial Committee to the Provinces of the Dominion, and the grounds of the objection to the abolition of that appeal entertained by the majority of Canadian lawyers,1 despite certain notable exceptions, are strikingly exemplified in the decision of the Committee in Canadian Pacific Wine Co., Ltd. v. Tuley and others. This appeal was brought from the Court of Appeal of British Columbia and asked for an order for the return of movable property of the appellants, including books and a store of liquor alleged to have been wrongfully seized, and for redress in respect of wrongful entry by police officers of the city of Vancouver into the appellants' warehouse. The action taken by the police arose out of the provincial Prohibition Act, and the essential point in the appeal was the contention that the Summary Convictions Act of the Provinces, under which it was sought to justify the proceedings of the police, was ultra vires. That enactment provides that, where a penalty or imprisonment is prescribed by any statute of the Province and no provision is made as to the manner of enforcement, such penalty or imprisonment shall be enforced on summary conviction before a justice, as if this were expressly so enacted in the statute imposing the sanction. This enactment was, it was contended by the appellants, ultra vires, since the Dominion Parliament had exclusive power, under the British North America Act, 1867, s. 91 (27), to legislate as to criminal law, including procedure in criminal matters. The issue was obviously a vital one, from the point of view of provincial autonomy, since an adverse decision would have struck at the whole basis of provincial power to deal with the liquor traffic in any effective manner. The Judicial Committee found no difficulty in upholding the validity both of the Prohibition Act itself and of the Summary Convictions Act. In the case of the former statute they held that it fell precisely within the principle of Attorney-General for Manitoba v. Manitoba License Holders' Association, and indeed the conclusion was inevitable. As regards the latter Act, they drew a clear distinction between the Dominion power to legislate for the peace, order, and good government of Canada generally, and for criminal procedure in connection therewith, and the exercise of provincial authority in the case of the Summary Convictions Act. This they justified under the exclusive powers of the Province under s. 92 of the Act of 1867 to deal with "(14) the administration of justice in the Province, including the constitution, maintenance, and organisation of provincial Courts, both of civil and of criminal jurisdiction, and including procedure in civil matters in these Courts; (15) the imposition of punishment by fine, penalty, or imprisonment, for enforcing any law of the Province made in relation to any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in this section"; and "(16) generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the Province." The decision, with its solution of the doubts which have been often expressed regarding the quasi-criminal legislation of the Provinces, has not gone without criticism 1 See this Journal, vol. iii, pp. 184-189 2 (1921) 37 T.L.R. 944. 8 [1902] A.C. 73. in the Dominion, but it is manifestly fully in accord with the decision in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion,1 and with the whole spirit of the British North America Act. 8 4 The High Court of Australia and the States.-While the Canadian Provinces have found a supporter of their privileges in the Privy Council, the Australian States have both during 2 and since the war found that the tendency of the High Court is to lean towards a generous extension of the powers of the Commonwealth to the diminution of the authority of the States. The degree to which this tendency has been carried is strikingly exemplified in the case of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. and others, in which it was held by a majority of the High Court that the awards of the Commonwealth Court of Arbitration are binding on the States in their dealings with their employees. The objections to such a situation are obvious enough, and it is not surprising that the decision has not been popular with the States as a whole. But there is a special reason for the dissatisfaction felt at the decision in that it reversed deliberately the contrary ruling laid down in 1906 in the case of the Federated Amalgamated Railway and Tramway Service Association v. New South Wales Railway Traffic Employés' Association, when the High Court, applying to the States the principle asserted for the benefit of the Commonwealth in D'Emden v. Pedder, held that the Commonwealth could not, save where expressly authorised by the Constitution, give to its agencies an operation which, if valid, would fetter, control, or interfere with the free exercise of the legislative or executive power of the States. The principle of the immunity of State instrumentalities thus asserted had until 1920 been regarded as beyond question, and the alteration of view is explained simply by the change of personnel in the High Court, the members of which, of course, are appointed by the Commonwealth Government, and, accordingly cannot be expected to be strong supporters of State rights. The variation of view is clearly contrary to the principles regarding the following of earlier decisions expounded by the House of Lords in Bourne v. Keane," but the High Court has, in doing so, exercised a privilege which is not enjoyed by the English Court of Appeal or the House of Lords, but is claimed by the Judicial Committee.R The High Court and the Privy Council. It is not surprising that it should have been felt in the Commonwealth that the case was precisely one in which the High Court should be asked to grant the necessary certificate permitting an appeal to the Judicial Committee. By the conjoint effect 1 [1896] A.C. 348. 'Keith, War Government of the Dominions, pp. 306 ff. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129. (1906) 4 C.L.R. 488. 8 (1904), 1 C.L.R. 91. Australian Workers' Union v. Adelaide Milling Co., Ltd. (1919), 26 C.L.R. 465. '[1919] A. C. 815, 874 per Lord Buckmaster. *See Levy v. London County Council (1895), 2 Q.B. 577, 581; Beamish v. Beamish (1861), 9 H.L.C. 274; Cushing v. Dupuy, 5 App. Cas. 409. of the Constitution (s. 74) and of Commonwealth legislation reserving constitutional cases to the High Court,1 that Court has the unfettered power of making its own decisions final by refusing a certificate, and this power was duly exercised,' again by a majority decision, Gavan Duffy and Powers JJ. dissenting. The refusal can, of course, be explained only on the theory that constitutional cases should be settled in Australia, for obviously on the merits no stronger case for the grant of a certificate can be imagined than a majority decision reversing an earlier decision which had stood for fourteen years without question as part of the law of the Commonwealth. An ingenious suggestion, however, has been made by Mr. Arthur Robinson, Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of Victoria, in his Presidential Address to the Law Institute of Victoria on November 25 last. The Judicial Committee, he points out, is the final authority as to whether any case does fall within the class of causes on which, under s. 74 of the Constitution, the High Court may constitute itself the final Court. Such cases are those of the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and a State or States or of the States inter se, while the true point for decision in the Engineers' Case3 is whether the State is a persona, bound to obey the commands of the Commonwealth. From this point of view there is, of course, no true conflict of powers, but the case permits also of the interpretation adopted by the High Court under which the point at issue is whether the employees of the State are solely under its legislative authority, or whether they fall under the authority of the Commonwealth in connection with its power to legislate regarding conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limit of any one State. It is, therefore, unlikely that the Judicial Committee would consent to grant leave to appeal, especially as it has shown every disposition to respect wholeheartedly the authority of the High Court within its own sphere. The only solution of the position from the point of view of the upholders of State rights is that suggested by Mr. Robinson, the modification of s. 74 at the revision of the Constitution which is now planned. But it would be idle to ignore the difficulties in the way of any such alteration, to which strenuous objections would certainly be raised by the Labour Party and by many supporters of the present Commonwealth Government. But the position indicates the very distinct disadvantages of the illogical compromise on the issue of appeals which was adopted by His Majesty's Government in 1900, acting on anticipations of the trend of events which have been entirely falsified in experience. 1 See Journ. Soc. Comp. Leg., vol. ix, pp. 269–80. 2 (1921), 29 C.L.R. 406. 28 C.L.R. 129. • Constitution, s. 51 (xxxv). See especially Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Collector of Customs, [1909] A.C. 345. SOUTH AMERICAN NOTES. [Contributed by WYNDHAM A. Bewes, Esq.] Immigration Laws.-Mr. Wyndham Bewes writes that a volume has been issued containing the Convention and documents resulting from the International Police Conference held at Buenos Aires in February 1920 by representatives of the Republics of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay on the invitation of the Argentine Government. By the Convention, dated February 29, 1920, the contracting countries undertake to provide mutual information respecting (a) attempts and acts tending to subvert social order, (b) publications of the same nature, (c) legal and administrative decisions directed to prevention or repression of such acts, (d) the preparation and perpetration of ordinary crimes, (e) individuals dangerous to society, (f) honourable persons at their request, (g) the bodies of unknown persons accompanied by finger-prints. By Art. 2 dangerous persons (e) are defined with reference to crimes against property or person, individuals who habitually and for profit carry on the white slave trade, and agitators and inciters to crime. By Art. 3 the kinds of information are detailed. With the object of forming an International Archive of Information duplicates of all information are to be sent to the Argentine Government, whether this directly interests it or not (Art. 4); but from these prescriptions political acts and the lawful movements of workmen in relation to the struggle between capital and labour are excluded (Art. 5). By Art. 7 the departure and expulsion of dangerous individuals are to be communicated. By Art. 8 police, on request, will take all proper steps to investigate a foreign crime. By Art. 10 all honourable persons are to be provided with their certificate of identity verified by fingerprints. The Convention (Art. 12) is recognised as administrative and therefore subject to any restrictions by law or regulation; and subject also to ratification (Art. 15). Subject to reservations made by the delegates of Brazil and Uruguay, certain recommendations were agreed with reference to (1) the prompt provisional arrest of fugitive criminals, (2) frontier police, (3) entrance of foreigners, (4) periodical visits of officials, (5) postal and telegraphic facilities. As regards (3) it is recommended (a) that minute information of any expulsion be given to the authorities of the country of the expelled person; (b) that passports be refused to dangerous persons; (c) that each country accept its expelled nationals; (d) that adequate postal and customs measures be adopted for the prevention of anti-social propaganda; (e) that foreigners unprovided with a police certificate of five years' good conduct be rejected; (f) that the captains and owners of ships carrying uncertificated foreigners be fined, and the ships detained until payment; (g) that transients be subject to a less stringent documentary requirement. A Mexican International Law Review.-The Revista Mexicana de Derecho International of 1920 (vol. ii) contains much valuable material for discussion, and among other contributions is to be noted the address pronounced in the University of Montevideo on April 20, 1920, by President Baltasar Brum to the law students (p. 227). His conclusions (p. 246) are as follows: Pan-American politics should be principally based on the following foundation: (a) an injury inflicted by extra-continental nations to the rights of any one of the American countries should be deemed an injury to each, and should originate uniform and common resistance; (b) without prejudice to joining the League of Nations, an American League should be constituted on the basis of complete equality of all the associated countries; (c) no matter which, by the laws of a country, should be judged by its judges or tribunals, can be withdrawn from its natural jurisdiction by means of diplomatic demands, which should only be permitted in an evident case of denial of justice; (d) every foreigner's child born on the American continent should have the nationality of the country of birth, unless, having attained majority and being in the country of origin, he express his desire to choose the nationality thereof; (e) all controversies, of whatever nature, which may arise between American countries, should be admitted to the arbitral decision of the League, when they cannot be resolved directly or by amicable mediation; (f) when an American country has any controversy with the League of Nations it may request the co-operation of the American League. President Brum relies on this co-operation, as an off-set to what, he thinks, is the insufficient representation of South America in the League of Nations. On pp. 382-402 is reproduced an article by Professor Amos S. Hershey, of the University of Indiana in the American Review of International Law (vol. xiii) on the "doctrine" of immediate pursuit, .e. in land operations, with immediate reference to the so-called "punitive expedition" of March 9, 1916, to Carrizal and the occupation of Ciudad Juárez in 1919. Previous similar expeditions in 1836, 1856 and 1877 gave rise to protests and the ultimate reciprocal agreements of 1856 and 1882. The case of the Caroline during the Canadian Rebellion of 1837 is also referred to. The editor denies the existence of the doctrine and the analogy of the pursuit of a delinquent vessel on the high seas. Nationality in Mexico.-Mexican nationality, as affected by the Constitution of 1917, is fully treated by Señor G. Fernández MacGrégor, |